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Wittgenstein‟s discussion of rule-following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called 
“the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date”. But does it? This 
paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce‟s distinctive scientific hierarchy. Peirce 
identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to 
identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this 
context, pertains to general predication. 
 
Rule-following scepticism, the paper suggests, results from running together two questions: “How is it 
that I can project rules?”, and, “What is it for a given usage of a rule to be right?”. In Peircean terms the 
former question, concerning the irreducibility of general predication (to singular reference), must be 
answered in phenomenology, while the latter, concerning the difference between true and false 
predication, is answered in logic. A failure to appreciate this distinction, it is argued, has led 
philosophers to focus exclusively on Wittgenstein‟s famous public account of rule-following rightness, 
thus overlooking a private, phenomenological dimension to Wittgenstein‟s remarks on following a rule 
which gives the lie to Kripke‟s reading of him as a sceptic.  
 
Introduction 
Wittgenstein noted that when we grasp a rule we grasp an idea that in principle outruns 
any set of particular applications of the rule. Consider counting, for example: 
 
...let us suppose that...[someone who is being taught to count] continues the series 
correctly, that is, as we do it. So now we can say he has mastered the system.–But 
how far need he continue the series for us to have the right to say this? Clearly you 




In a similar vein, Peirce wrote: 
 
Every cook has in her recipe-book a collection of rules, which she is accustomed to 
follow. An apple pie is desired. Now, observe that we seldom, probably never, 
desire a single individual thing. What we want is something which shall produce a 
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certain pleasure of a certain kind...An apple pie, then, is desired...But it is not any 
particular apple pie; for it is to be made for the occasion; and the only particularity 
about it is that it is to be made and eaten today. For that, apples are wanted; and 
remembering that there is a barrel of apples in the cellar, the cook goes to the cellar 
and takes the apples that are uppermost and handiest. That is an example of 




What is common to both these remarks is the idea that we have understandings which 
reach beyond any set of particular cases.
3
  
     There is thus an essential normativity involved in rule-following, and this claim may 
usefully be divided into two parts. The first is that understanding a rule requires one in 
principle always to be able to project that rule. For this reason, no finite number of 
applications can exhaust the rule. Secondly, a norm is essentially something which 
discriminates between alternatives whether it is, for example, an ethical norm which says 
that one course of action is more good than other possible actions, an aesthetic norm 
which says that certain types of thing are more beautiful or otherwise intrinsically 
attractive than others, or (at the more general level) a „meaning-norm‟ which dictates that 
the extension of a certain predicate should embrace certain individuals and not others. We 
can give no meaning to the notion of a norm which does not so discriminate, or „carve 
logical space‟. 
     Aren‟t these understandings which reach beyond any set of particular cases rather 
mysterious? Indeed, philosophers have puzzled over how rules and/or rule-followers 
manage to perform their characteristic feats of (what may be termed) „semantic reaching‟ 
– feats which, when one thinks about them in the right way, are liable to seem 
„superphysicalistic‟. For no physical process seems infinitely inexhaustible in the way 
that rules or meanings apparently are. Once we grasp the rule for addition we know that, 
to the heat death of the Universe and beyond, adding two things to two other things will 
produce four things. How do we, whose minds are finite and demonstrably fallible, 
manage to know such a thing? 
     Thus, Wittgenstein‟s discussion of rule-following is widely perceived to have 
identified a distinctive and challenging philosophical problem, “the rule-following 
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problem”, which has been influentially presented by Saul Kripke in particular as “the 
most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date”.4 
 
1.2. The “Problem” 
Kripke notes that it is not logically impossible, supposing for simplicity‟s sake that I have 
never added numbers larger than 56, for what he calls a “bizarre sceptic” to declare that 
he believes my answer to the sum “68 plus 57” should be 5! When I express incredulity 
he explains that what I mean by addition is in fact the „quus‟ function: 
x quus y    = x + y, if x and y are less than 57 
  = 5 otherwise. 
As I have never added a number higher than 56 before, this function does not directly 
contradict my past instances of adding. So how can I prove to the sceptic that that is not 
in fact what I meant by “the sum of 68 and 57”? 
     It would seem that the answer lies in the fact that adding is a specifiable algorithm. 
One takes two piles of, say, apples, of the two quantities that are to be added. One pools 
the apples and counts the total. One can then claim that this algorithm is of course to be 
used to evaluate all cases of addition, not just those below 57. However, as Kripke points 
out, the sceptic can reply that by counting (the apple total) I really mean “quounting”, a 
procedure which yields the answer 5 when one of the quantities is greater than 56. Thus, 
following my algorithm will yield the answer “5” just as surely as direct addition. In fact, 
as Kripke points out, the sceptic can likewise counter any attempt I might make to explain 
adding in terms of a more basic procedure or recipe: 
 
It is tempting to answer the sceptic by appealing from one rule to another more 
“basic” rule. But the sceptical move can be repeated at the more “basic” level also. 
Eventually...I am left with a rule which is completely unreduced to any other. How 
can I justify my present application of such a rule, when a sceptic could easily 
interpret it so as to yield any of an indefinite number of other results?
5  
 
Kripke argues that the paradox is not just the epistemological one that in following a rule 
“I can have no justification for one response rather than another”.6 There is no fact about 
me, no set of unambiguous instructions encoded in my brain which determines whether I 
mean „plus‟ or „quus‟. 
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     At this point many philosophers wish to respond that the challenge is quite ridiculous. 
The world contains natural kinds and regularities, it will be claimed, and so surely we can 
identify our rules with these on some level.
7
 Answers to the sceptic of this form usually 
claim that our rule-following behaviour is a disposition we possess. Just as delicate 
crystal has the disposition to shatter if knocked, we have the disposition to produce “125” 
as the answer to “68 + 57”. 
     Kripke replies that our dispositions are finite, in the sense that the number of adding 
operations a person can perform before they physically expire is finite; yet the adding rule 
is infinite, and must cover the infinite number of addings that no human is physically 
capable of performing. Once we extend the plus-function beyond all such finite 
dispositions, an opportunity arises for the rule-following sceptic to claim that the rule 
should be extended in apparently bizarre ways.
8
 
     Moreover, he writes, “a dispositional account misconceives the sceptic‟s problem – to 
find a past fact that justifies my present response”9, and claims that the anti-sceptic cannot 
claim to locate a source for „rule-making‟ normativity in anything dispositional or 
otherwise naturalistic without begging the question. Kripke considers as an example the 
claim that if our brains were technologically enhanced then of course we would perform 
addition on numbers out of our present range of mental arithmetic. If the rule-following 
sceptic replies, “No, I believe we would perform „quaddition‟”, then the anti-sceptic can 
only claim to know that we would perform addition by implicitly drawing on the rule.
10 
     Thus, although it was just noted that the metaphysical dimension of the rule-following 
problem as presented by Kripke is not to be overlooked, the problem seems to be a 
challenging synthesis of epistemological and metaphysical demands. It cannot be solved 
by pure ontological postulation (for example, of brute dispositions to “go on”), without an 
epistemological story which somehow explains our grasp and straightforward application 
of whatever is being postulated to solve the problem – or so Kripke claims.  
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     Kripke considers a further counter-argument which suggests that what distinguishes 
the „plus‟ from the „quus‟ rule is a certain special feeling which „plus‟ has and „quus‟ 
does not: 
 
Why not argue that “meaning addition by „plus‟” denotes an irreducible experience, 
with its own special quale, known directly to each of us by introspection?
11  
 
Kripke argues that this solution (which he claims derives from “classical empiricism”) 
will not work, however. It does not answer the epistemological demand made by the 
sceptic that the proffered solution to the rule-following problem should somehow justify 
the way in which I go on. How can a feeling deliver the result that, say, 68 plus 57 is 125, 
not 5? 
 
If there were a special experience of „meaning‟ addition by „plus‟, analogous to a 
headache, it would not have the properties that a state of meaning addition by 
„plus‟ ought to have – it would not tell me what to do in new cases.12  
 
Moreover, Kripke argues that the idea of meaning as “an introspectible experience” is 
precisely what Wittgenstein was concerned to argue against in the Philosophical 
Investigations, most notably in the famous private language argument.  
      Kripke concludes that, incredible as it may seem, we really have no justification for 
extending our meanings in the way that we do, if we consider ourselves in isolation.
13 
There is no fact about me that determines that I mean „plus‟ rather than „quus‟. Having 





1.3. The “Sceptical Solution”   
Kripke described the rule-following problem as the most “radical” form of scepticism 
philosophy has seen to date, and it seems that it would indeed be devastating if it 
succeeded. If every general predicate could be extended in any bizarre way with equal 
justification, what would be left of language? What would be left of thought? Note that 
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the sceptical problem transfers naturally from a problem about meaning (which is how 
Kripke describes it) to a problem about truth (or, as it is often put, about „truth-
conditions‟). If we cannot refute the sceptic‟s claim that “57 + 68 = 5” is a legitimate 
extension of the plus-function, this seems to undermine our own claim that “57 + 68 = 
125” is true. However, Kripke offers a response to the rule-following sceptic.  
     When it comes to sceptical problems, Kripke writes, one must distinguish between a 
“straight solution” to the problem concerned, which answers the problem on the sceptic‟s 
own terms, and a “sceptical solution”, which concedes that the problem is unanswerable 
but argues that, for some reason, the fact that the problem is unanswerable does not 
matter.
1 5
 In the case of rule-following scepticism, then, a straight solution would locate 
some fact about me which determines that I mean „plus‟ rather than „quus‟. Kripke 
therefore argues that only a sceptical solution is possible, which “...does not allow us to 
speak of a single individual, considered by himself and in isolation, as ever meaning 
anything.”16 To this end, he replaces what he calls “truth conditions” for what someone 
means with what he calls “justification conditions” or “assertability conditions”. These 
latter concern the role which saying that someone means something might play in a 
community:  
 
All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is that 
there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately 
assertible, and that the game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in 
our lives. No supposition that „facts correspond‟ to those assertions is needed.17  
 
     So, if we look at one person in isolation, all we can say is that he applies rules 
unhesitatingly according to his own inclinations. However, where he departs from the 
accepted usage of the rule (for instance by failing to carry a number while adding) the 
community corrects him, and it is this rather than his own certainty that establishes the 
proper extension of the rule. Kripke is careful to say that the rule cannot be reduced to 
facts about community usage,
18
 stressing that rather than truth-conditions for the proper 
extension of „plus‟, his sceptical solution offers only “assertability” conditions. Still, 
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2.1. The Role of Phenomenology in Peirce’s Hierarchy of the Sciences 
Phenomenology has been an influential strand in twentieth century philosophy. Peirce‟s 
excursion into it is little known and (as was unfortunately common with Peirce) isolated 
from the main current of development in the discipline. According to Peirce, 
phenomenology studies the properties of our experiences without caring whether those 
experiences are veridical or illusory. What is curious about the methodology of 
phenomenology is that one does not offer any sort of proof (either a priori or a 
posteriori) of the results one is presenting. One merely reports what one experiences, 
believing that if one‟s interlocutors are candid about their own experience, they will 
observe similar results. If philosophers aren‟t willing to be candid with one another about 
their experiences, phenomenology will not work. It is important to note, however, that the 
most important role phenomenology has to play for Peirce is in deriving new and useful 
ideas (rather than making any truth-claims). This arises from the place of phenomenology 
in his distinctive hierarchy of the sciences. 
     Peirce engaged in the project, popular in the nineteenth century, of drawing up a 
classification of the sciences according to which each branch of science draws laws and 
principles from the science(s) above it, and observational data from the science(s) 
below.
19
 Peirce put mathematics (defined very broadly as “the science that draws 
necessary conclusions”) at the top of his scientific hierarchy. After mathematics he placed 
phenomenology which, as noted, studies that which is immediately present to 
consciousness without making reference to questions of truth or falsity. Some 
phenomenologists might wish to object that phenomenology is not without a conception 
of truth, for one may give an accurate or inaccurate report of one‟s own experiences. 
However Peirce did wish to define phenomenology this way; it was important to him that 
truth be „public‟ in a way that is not possible for reports of one‟s own experiences. After 
phenomenology, Peirce envisaged a progression of three “normative sciences” 
culminating in logic. Only after logic had established the concept of truth and the norms 
which govern its most efficient discovery could the special sciences (including 
metaphysics) emerge and make their particular truth-claims, he thought.  
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2.2. Peirce’s Categories. 
Peirce conceives phenomenology‟s main role to be the identification of the most basic 
philosophical categories. Categories have traditionally been understood as the most 
fundamental types into which can be sorted the things in Heaven and Earth which are 
dreamt of by one‟s philosophy.  Peirce believed there were three different fundamental 
“modes of being”: “Firstness”, “Secondness” and “Thirdness”.20 In his 1903 Harvard 
lectures Peirce presents these categories by presenting certain unmistakable and 
characteristic experiences, and then treating what those experiences have in common as 
ideas in their own right – though it is important to note that the categories are not to be 
identified with any particular experiences but prescinded from them. 
     The first category Peirce refers to as “feeling”: 
 
Imagine, if you please, a consciousness in which there is no comparison, no 
relation, no recognized multiplicity– nothing but a simple positive character. Such 
a consciousness might be just an odour, say a smell of attar...(5.44). 
 
Firstness thus has a lot in common with what is nowadays referred to as qualia. Consider, 
for example, the concept of the taste of pineapple. This concept is irreducible to any other 
concept(s): as Bertrand Russell might have put it, the taste of pineapple must be known 
by acquaintance, not description. Integrating qualia into epistemologies which do not 
allow them to be irreducible has been found to be a difficult problem.
21 Firstness refers 
not just to the pureness or conceptual simplicity of the taste of pineapple, however, but 
also to its radical newness. When someone first encounters the taste, their sensorium may 
be said to „grow‟. New possible experiences have been added to their understanding. 
     The second category Peirce refers to as “struggle”: 
 
                                      
20
  In the 1903 Harvard lectures, Peirce actually claimed that Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are 
only his “Short List” of “universal” categories, and that he also had derived a “Long List” of 
“particular” categories. The difference between the two lists is as follows:  
The particular categories form a series, or set of series, only one of each series being present, or 
at least predominant, in any one phenomenon. The universal categories, on the other hand, belong 
to every phenomenon, one being perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than 
another but all of them belonging to every phenomenon (5.43). 
However, he treats this long list of categories as greatly inferior in importance to the short list, and I 
will therefore ignore it henceforth. 
21
  A recent very influential presentation of this problem may be found in Frank Jackson‟s thought-
experiment which centers on an unfortunate colour-deprived natural scientist named “Black and 
White Mary”. (See Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982), pp. 
127-136.) However, the problem goes back at least as far as Hume‟s discussion of “the missing 
shade of blue”, (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Niddich 
(Clarendon Press, 1978), I. 1. i, p. 6), which has also been much discussed in recent times.  
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Imagine yourself making a strong muscular effort, say that of pressing with all your 
might against a half-open door. Obviously, there is a sense of resistance (5.45). 
 
This second category also presents itself as “surprise”:  
 
Experience is our only teacher...But precisely how does this action of experience 
take place? It takes place by a series of surprises. There is no need of going into 
details. At one time a ship is sailing along in the trades over a smooth sea, the 
navigator having no more positive expectation than that of the usual monotony of 
such a voyage, when suddenly she strikes upon a rock (5.50-51). 
 
The jarring contact between ship and rock in this example highlights an important aspect 
of Secondness: the kind of direct contact between particular existent objects which 
characterises efficient causation. Note that, unlike Firstness, which might take the form of 
a single quality alone in its own possible world, at least two things are required to create a 
struggle or surprise.  
     Peirce introduces his third category as follows: 
 
We open our eyes and look at something. Now if we are not in a sleepwalking state 
we immediately form a judgement as to what sort of thing it is that we are looking 
at; and that judgement predicates some general quality of the object of 
perception...As I am looking out the window in writing these words my eye lights 
on something and before I know what I am about, I have told myself that it is a 
chimney,... a chimney of red brick, with a drab piece at the top. I could not think all 




Thus, a fundamental idea that conveys the concept of Thirdness is predication – the 
attributing of a property or properties to something. Note that Peirce is not making any 
claim about the truth of such predications. He is merely claiming that we do so predicate. 
Indeed it seems that we cannot avoid doing so – for note the way Peirce puts it. He says, 
“before I know what I am about, I have told myself that it is a chimney...”.23 Therefore, 
my experience does not just include immediate feelings and the shock of reaction with 
objects. I also represent the world to myself as having certain (projectible, general) 
properties. 
     It might be protested that this description does not differentiate Thirdness from 
Firstness, which is also some form of representation. However the pure feelings which 
characterise Firstness have no implications beyond the present moment or beyond the 
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  Charles Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 149.  
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  [my emphasis] 
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entirely degenerate feeling-subject (who consists in nothing but the feeling itself). In 
order to truly represent something, by contrast, one requires at least three separate 
entities: a representer of some kind, a thing represented, and a predicate (or „way‟ in 
which that thing is represented as being). A further dimension of Thirdness worth noting 
is prediction (which may usefully be understood as a species of predication – predication 
of properties to future events): 
 
Now for Thirdness. Five minutes of our waking life will hardly pass without our 
making some kind of prediction; and in the majority of cases these predictions are 
fulfilled in the event. Yet a prediction is essentially of a general nature, and cannot 
ever be completely fulfilled...(1.26) 
 
     Peirce believed that these three categories were not only irreducible one to another but 
also exhaustive, for any putative „Fourthness‟ relation may be reduced to a structured set 
of „Thirdnesses‟. This claim is somewhat controversial,24 but if one takes seriously the 
role of phenomenology envisaged by Peirce in his most mature work on his categories, 
this renders it incumbent on those who would argue for further categories to breathe 




2.3. Realism and Rule-following 
It is no secret that realism was extremely important to Peirce. He may be understood as 
affirming the reality of all three of his categories.
26
 However when arguing for realism he 
focussed particularly on establishing the reality of Thirdness. He believed that much 
realism in his day could be understood as motivated by an appreciation of real 
Secondness alone. One manifestation of this is the table-thumping (or, in the case of Dr 
Johnston contra Berkeley, „stone-kicking‟) realism according to which the real is the 
causally efficacious. This approach to realism arguably continues to dominate today.
27
 By 
contrast, Peirce thought that Thirdness is a category people tend to deny, and he identified 
the denial of Thirdness with nominalism, medievally construed. In the last section we saw 
Thirdness identified with predication and prediction. The key to demonstrating the reality 
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  See, for instance, Hookway, Peirce, pp. 97-101. 
25
  Examples of this seem so far absent from the literature on Peirce. 
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  For an interesting discussion of this issue see Max Fisch, “Peirce‟s Progress from Nominalism 
toward Realism”, in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch, ed. K.L. Ketner & 
J.W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 193-5. 
27
  A general convergence between twentieth century realism and empiricism has produced a 
widespread adherence to what may be referred to as a „causal epistemology‟ (David Armstrong, and 
Michael Devitt being recent examples of this), though more recently there has been a tendency 
amongst realists to neglect epistemology altogether, and to express realism purely in terms of a 
somewhat mysterious two-place relation of „direct reference‟ between our terms and particular 
existent things in the world.  
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of Thirdness (or scholastic realism) for Peirce is therefore the fact that we make 
predictions which happen to come true .
28
 
     The rule-following problem was introduced by noting that we have understandings 
that reach beyond particular cases, which allow us to project our concepts beyond the 
finite number of applications which we have encountered in the past. This very idea was 
then found to be problematic, productive of scepticism. Kripke argues that we have 
realism if the justification the rule provides for going on in a certain way can be shown to 
be somehow reducible to particular existent things (which Kripke calls “facts”). In the 
face of the sceptic‟s demonstration that rules are not so reducible we need to give up a 
realist “picture of language”. This can be seen as understanding realism in terms of 
Secondness. Peirce on the other hand argues that we have Thirdness precisely if rules are 
not reducible to particular things (or – to put it another way – if general predicates are 
not reducible to their instantiations). And yet we have an understanding of general 
predicates just as we have an understanding of particular things. Yet, Kripke‟s sceptic 
will ask, what metaphysics might ground such an understanding? 
 
2.4. The Phenomenology of Projectibility 
I will now explore the possibility that there is no metaphysics to „ground‟ our ability to 
project general concepts, because no metaphysics is required. If we take seriously Peirce‟s 
hierarchy of the sciences, perhaps we cannot proceed to metaphysics without certain 
fundamental conceptions first having been established. We would not search amongst the 
observations which constitute physics experimentation for the derivative (that is, dy/dx), 
despite the fact that the differential calculus is used in physics with great frequency, and 
to powerful effect. This would be a hopeless mistake, because the concept of the 
derivative belongs to mathematics, and physics presupposes mathematics. Likewise, an 
entomologist would not search in the field amongst ants and butterflies for the gene, 
despite the fact that his entire taxonomic work is premised on the fact of genetic 
variation. So why, then, should we search in metaphysics for normativity?
29
 
                                      
28
  This point is perhaps most succinctly expressed in Peirce‟s famous “Harvard stone experiment”, on 
which, see in particular Manley Thompson, “Peirce‟s Experimental Proof of Scholastic Realism”, in 
Studies in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce, ed. Moore and Robin (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1964), and a reply to Thompson‟s paper by Peter Skagestad, “Pragmatic 
Realism: The Peircean Argument Reexamined”, Review of Metaphysics, 33, no. 3 (1980), pp. 527-
540.  
29
  These considerations may equally be raised against a burgeoning sub-field in contemporary 
metaphysics, which might be termed the „ontology of mathematics‟. (Major figures include John 
Bigelow, Penelope Maddy, Hartry Field and Ed Zalta.) This particular corner of inquiry addresses 
itself to questions such as whether numbers exist. If Peirce is right about the proper hierarchy of the 
sciences, however, it follows that neither taking up a position for or against this question has any 
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     We saw that Peirce‟s phenomenological  derivation of Thirdness stated: 
 
We open our eyes and look at something. Now if we are not in a sleepwalking state 
we immediately form a judgement as to what sort of thing it is that we are looking 




We project our ideas into new situations as those situations present themselves to us 
perceptually, and thereby represent the world as conforming to certain predicates. Peirce 
points out that this happens every time we open our eyes. If this basic and utterly 
irrepressible fact conflicts with a particular metaphysical theory framed by philosophers 
for philosophers (a theory according to which some particular fact must exist for every 
descriptive predicate in our language, to „ground‟ its meaning), which should give way? 
 
2.5. General Predication Distinguished from True General Predication 
To claim that Thirdness is an irreducible mode of being, which surrounds us on all sides, 
is not to say that every general predication we make is true, and therefore that there is no 
distinction between „subjective‟ and „objective‟ generality.31 To put the point another 
way,  Peirce‟s phenomenology of Thirdness highlights both our awareness of law-
governed patterns in the objects of our experience and our awareness of our own general 
predications concerning those objects. Of course, if law-governed patterns did not obtain 
in the world, we would not perform general predications, but the two aspects of Thirdness 
may be prescinded from one another. The issue, then, of how to distinguish real from 
unreal Thirdness (which presupposes Peirce‟s claim that at least some Thirdness is real, 
that is, his scholastic realism) is separate from the issue of the irreducibility of Thirdness 
(both real and unreal) to other modes of being. 
     These two questions with respect to Thirdness are run together (and both dismissed) 
by Kripke precisely because he assumes that there is only one mode of being – particular 
things. Peirce‟s scientific hierarchy, on the other hand, allows him to give separate 
accounts of the irreducibility and the reality of Thirdness – the former in phenomenology 
and the latter in logic. A great deal has been said about the logical issue in the Peirce 
literature. Very roughly, real Thirdness is sorted from unreal by a community of inquiry 
                                                                                                              
point. Metaphysics, being several layers down from mathematics in the scientific hierarchy, has 
nothing to offer it in the way of „grounding‟. (Similar morals are also suggested with respect to 
recent attempts to ground ethics metaphysically.) 
30
  Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking, p. 149. 
31
  Scare-quotes have been inserted as Peirce did not like this usage of the terms „subjective‟ and 
„objective‟, nascent in his day and deriving from Germany. He preferred a more medieval usage of 
the term „objective‟ according to which it meant something akin to intentional. However the German 
usage has now become orthodoxy. 
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who generate general hypotheses with predictive consequences, then test those 
consequences thereby winnowing true from false hypotheses. The rest of this paper will 
therefore focus on the former issue as relatively underdiscussed and, it will be argued, as 
the key to fully unravelling the rule-following problem.  
     Some hint of the separateness of these two questions was already present when it was 
noted that the claim that rules are essentially normative may be divided into two parts – 
the claim that understanding a rule requires one to be able always to project the rule, and 
the claim that a rule is something which discriminates between alternatives – that is, with 
respect to which there is an essential possibility of error. These two criteria for 
normativity come apart insofar as one can have projectibility without the possibility of 
error – for instance with respect to what Wittgenstein called a “private language”, though 
as Wittgenstein suggested, such a thing is of questionable value and really does not 
deserve to be described as a language. Conversely (though, it must be admitted, more 
contentiously in Peirce‟s pragmatist framework) it seems that one can have the possibility 
of error without projectibility, to the extent that one can be in error about particular facts 
located at particular times and places. More will be said about the distinction between 
these two questions in the next section. 
     Thus, our ability to project general predicates is a Moorean fact. 
 
2.6. What to Say to the “Bizarre Sceptic” 
So what exactly is the Peircean to say to Kripke‟s sceptic? First of all it must be 
reemphasised that what Kripke calls “the most radical and original sceptical problem that 
philosophy has seen to date”, is a tightly woven mixture of what are in fact two separate 
questions. In Kripke‟s terms, the first is the question of what makes us able to project 
rules such as the plus-function onto new cases, and the second is the question of the 
proper “assertability conditions” for rules such as the plus-function. Among the various 
“straight” solutions to the sceptic, which Kripke considered and rejected, was the 
suggestion that the difference between „plus‟ and „quus‟ might consist in some sort of 
quale, “as unique and irreducible as that of seeing yellow or feeling a headache”.32 
     Kripke treated this response with a certain levity: 
 
suppose I do in fact feel a certain headache with a very special quality whenever I 
think of the „+‟ sign. How on earth would this headache help me figure out whether 
I ought to answer „125‟ or „5‟ when asked about „68 + 57‟?33 
 
                                      
32
  Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules, p. 41. 
33
  Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules, pp. 41-2. 
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However here he is running together two questions. The sceptic was meant to be asking 
how it is that I can project the plus-function. In his objection to this solution, however, 
Kripke is complaining that a person‟s grasp of the concept of plus does not deliver true 
propositions containing plus in all possible situations. For the sceptic claims to grasp the 
function perfectly and yet claims that “68 + 57 = 5”. But why should a person‟s grasp of a 
concept deliver infallible insight into the truth or otherwise of all sentences containing it? 
It is no wonder the rule-following problem seems insuperable. The fact that Kripke has 
chosen a mathematical example to present his rule-following scepticism is perhaps 
significant in disguising this slide from projectibility to truth, given the overwhelmingly a 
priori character of mathematics. 
     Thus, at least part of the solution to the rule-following problem was lurking where 
Kripke least expected. Concepts, insofar as they are distinct for us, each have a special 
irreducible quality that allows us to reidentify them in applications beyond the finite set of 
instances with which we have been acquainted. Looked at one way, this capacity can 
seem almost miraculous. Yet we just do have this capacity. Consider, for example, the 
phenomenology of reidentifying concepts in philosophy. A concept such as, say, 
noumenal can be recognised across an enormous variety of philosophical discussions 
where it is never mentioned explicitly. It would be foolish (not to mention intellectually 
debilitating) to deny that we can do this. Of course, this is not offered as a proof that we 
have the capacity to reidentify concepts, but as a candid report of cognitive experience. 
This experience however is so fundamental that to deny it is arguably even worse than 
denying that I have two hands.  
     Interestingly, Peirce‟s category of Firstness is salient here. It was noted that Firstness 
pertained to irreducible qualities such as the taste of pineapple. Insofar as this irreducible 
qualitative character can be ascribed to concepts as well as to human sensations, then, 
there is a certain “Firstness of Thirdness”.34 In short, I cannot reduce the way in which the 
general concepts „plus‟ and „quus‟ differ to some “fact”, but neither can I reduce the way 
in which the general concepts „red‟ and „yellow‟ differ to some “fact”. This does not 
mean, however, that the concepts do not differ.  
                                      
3 4
  Christopher Hookway has made this point with respect to the concept „chair‟: 
Associated with a notion like chair is a body of laws and generalizations....With this is associated 
a distinctive firstness,...we can experience something as an aesthetic unity without intellectually 
grasping how its elements are mediated in the whole; but, an intellectual understanding of the 
whole will require a grasp of these mediating relations. It is suggestive, if obscure, to describe the 
felt quality as the „firstness of a thirdness‟ (Hookway, p. 174).  
Peirce also talks about Firstness of Thirdness, but in the sense of the qualitative character of 
Thirdness per se (which would be a pure abstract idea of representation itself), not of individual 
Thirdnesses. See, for example, 1.530-3. 
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     Is this a “straight” or a “sceptical” solution to the rule-following problem? In one 
sense it is perfectly straight, for Kripke claimed that to answer the sceptic there only 
needs to be a “fact that I meant plus, not quus”.35 This is true insofar as plus and quus just 
do feel different to me, and I believe that if I were to project them myself I would end up 
with differing results. But what Kripke really meant was that there needs to be some 
particular existent fact to which my „meaning plus‟ might be reduced. This is really – in 
Peircean terms – the demand that Thirdness (and Firstness) be reducible to Secondness. 




     Paul Boghossian has noted that such a view, which he calls “robust realism”, is 
wrongly overlooked as a possible response to Kripke: 
 
Let robust realism designate the view that judgements about meaning are factual, 
irreducible, and judgement-independent. Then...the major alternatives to robust 
realism are beset by very serious difficulties...Meaning properties appear to be 




If Peirce is right about the role of phenomenology in philosophy, then one only needs to 
examine one‟s experience in order to roundly endorse this statement. Moreover, I shall 




Wittgenstein is notorious for the gnomic nature of his philosophical writings, and for the 
many conflicting interpretations to which they have given rise. Nevertheless, one may 
search the Philosophical Investigations in vain for a passage where Wittgenstein openly 
makes the sceptical claim he is so widely credited with. Consider for example the passage 
at §201, which is often cited to establish Wittgenstein‟s rule-following scepticism: 
 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because 
every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if 
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to 
conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here... 
 
                                      
35
  Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules, p. 11. 
36
 In an original and little-discussed paper, Richard Rorty has argued that realism may be understood 
precisely as antireductionism via a comparison between Peirce and Wittgenstein. See Rorty, 
“Pragmatism, Categories, and Language”, Philosophical Review 70 (1961), especially p. 204.  
37
  Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations”, pp. 547-8. 
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What follows this is usually ignored, but is in fact crucial: 
 
What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going 
against it” in actual cases. 
 
What kind of a sceptical claim is this?  
 
3.1. No Rule-Following Intermediary 
What Wittgenstein is concerned to emphasise is that in particular cases we “know how to 
go on” in applying a given rule, without certain conditions being satisfied that 
philosophers take for granted.
38
 For instance, as §201 points out, we know how to go on 
without having to interpret the rule. We also know how to go on without in any sense 
„being told what to do‟ by the rule: 
 
One does not feel that one has always got to wait upon the nod (the whisper) of the 




In fact, much of Wittgenstein‟s discussion of rule-following is concerned with drawing 
out the fact – surprising when looked at under certain philosophical lights – that we 
“know how to go on” without any intermediary between us and the rule at all. At various 
points in his discussion of rule-following he considers a number of possible candidates 
for such an intermediary, and rejects them for diverse reasons. For instance, in §186, he 
considers “a new insight” in this light:  
 
“What you are saying, then, comes to this: a new insight–intuition–is needed at 
every step to carry out the order „+n‟ correctly.” 
 
This however, he argues, begs the question of what the „correct‟ answer is. This passage 
seems to be the source of Kripke‟s demand that, if an ontological ground for rule-
following be proffered in response to the rule-following sceptic, this ground must 
somehow justify our going on in the way we do. However, Kripke does not consider the 
possibility that the lack of justification which Wittgenstein is pointing out is not in fact a 
condition on successful rule-following that we should be satisfying but are not, and which 
therefore triggers radical rule-following scepticism, but rather a description of rule-
following fact. 
                                      
38
  Rorty also makes this point. See Rorty, “Pragmatism, Categories, and Language”, p. 213. 
39
  Wittgenstein, Investigations, §223. 
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3.2. The Rule and the Machine 
Wittgenstein is also keen to highlight the open-ended nature of rules, in that there is no 
“totality of conditions” that determines the application of any given rule in any given 
case. In §193, he explicitly points out that following a rule is not like the causal working 
of a machine, in that “the movement of the machine-as-symbol is predetermined in a 
different sense from that in which the movement of any given machine is predetermined”. 
This use of the phrase “machine-as-symbol” is interesting in the present context. 
Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting that rules consist in something over and above brute 
efficient causal reaction. The “machine-as-symbol” is irreducible to the finite, fallible 
instances of its operation (which is illustrated, Wittgenstein suggests, by such facts as that 
the machine-as-symbol “never breaks down”). Rather, the machine-as-symbol appears to 
be an idealisation of finite actual machines. 
     Again, this passage is read by Kripke as Wittgenstein blocking a possible exit from 
rule-following scepticism,
40
 and yet it may equally be read as Wittgenstein blocking 
another mistaken way of understanding rule-following. Wittgenstein further characterises 
the contrast between rules and causal reactions by saying that with the machine-as-
symbol, its future movement seems to be somehow already „in‟ the machine: 
 
“But I don‟t mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense) determines the future 
use causally and as a matter of experience, but that in a queer way, the use itself is 
in some sense present.”....Really the only thing wrong with what you say is, „in 
some sense‟!41 
 
Why does Wittgenstein say that the only thing wrong is the “in some sense”? His point 
seems to be that this would indicate that it is not something perfectly ordinary for the 
future use to be already present. It is also characteristic of Peirce‟s view of predication 
that the future use of a concept is already in some sense present. For instance, he writes: 
 
Not only will meaning always, more or less, in the long run, mould reactions to 
itself, but it is only in doing so that its own being consists. For this reason I call this 
element of the phenomenon or object of thought the element of Thirdness. It is that 
which is what it is by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the future (1.343). 
 
     The idealisation which Wittgenstein speaks of with respect to the “machine-as-
symbol” is nothing but generality as understood by Peirce. Thus, Wittgenstein‟s 
                                      
40
  Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules, p. 34. 
41
  Wittgenstein, Investigations, §195. 
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discussion of rule-following is best read not as saying that we have no principled way of 
saying that our terms mean anything at all, as Kripke has suggested, but as saying, like 
Peirce, that we have understandings which are irreducible to particular present facts, and 
which just do project beyond them. 
 
3.3. Phenomenology, Scepticism and Common-sense 
There is a sense in which Wittgenstein does raise sceptical worries in his discussion of 
rule-following. Throughout the Investigations he makes dramatic use of dialogue with a 
questioning interlocutor who frequently expresses incredulity. However Wittgenstein 
almost always seeks to lay this incredulity to rest.
42
 His famous remark that philosophy 
“leaves everything as it is”43 may be interpreted as meaning that his scepticism is 
intended to neatly target erroneous philosophical pictures, while leaving no „collateral 
damage‟ in our non-philosophical lives.  
     Whether Wittgenstein actually succeeds in this regard has been a matter of some 
controversy. However, to call Wittgenstein a rule-following sceptic is grievously to 
distort the relevant passages of the Investigations. Kripke does acknowledge that 
Wittgenstein would not wish to call himself a sceptic.
44
 However he then likens 
Wittgenstein to Berkeley, whose claim to be defending “common-sense” when he 




     Consider, however, Wittgenstein‟s philosophical methodology in his extended 
discussion of rule-following. Note the careful, detailed introspection with respect to what 
one would or would not wish to say in different contexts, and the close attention to our 
actual practices. Somewhat notoriously, he does not make any truth-claims. (“If one tried 
to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because 
everyone would agree to them.”46) For this reason, Wittgenstein‟s discussion of rule-
following has been widely interpreted as a form of quietistic metaphysical antirealism, 
according to which all of our current “ways of going on” are necessarily descriptive of 
some fact about the world. But the lack of truth-claims could equally mean that 
Wittgenstein is not doing metaphysics at all. Rather, he is engaged in some other, more 
fundamental, philosophical project. Alternatively, Wittgenstein‟s discussion has often 
                                      
42
  For, as he puts it, “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language”. (Wittgenstein, Investigations, §109). 
43
  Wittgenstein, Investigations, §124. 
44
  Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules, p. 83. 
45
  Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules, p. 64. 
46
  Wittgenstein, Investigations, §128. 
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been interpreted as a form of quietistic logic, whereby all community-sanctioned use of 
general predicates is automatically true. Wittgenstein‟s inquiry goes deeper even than 
this, however. 
     I will now suggest that what Wittgenstein is offering the philosophical world in the 
Investigations is not a new and highly original form of scepticism, but what may be 
referred to as the phenomenology of Thirdness.
47
 Like Peirce, he is exploring the way in 
which this category manifests itself in our thought and lives. Wittgenstein never prescinds 
this concept in the strong, general form in which Peirce does. (Wittgenstein‟s relentless 
drive towards theoretical heterogeneity would most probably have prevented that.) 
Nevertheless, the outlines of Peirce‟s Thirdness (and also Firstness, in the form of 
conceptual qualia or – in Peircean terms – „the Firstness of Thirdness‟) are recognisable 
within Wittgenstein‟s philosophical landscape. We have seen that according to Peirce the 
proper role of phenomenology is to produce not truth-claims but useful concepts. It is 
arguable that what has been most powerful about the later Wittgenstein‟s philosophy has 
been the novel and suggestive concepts (such as „form of life‟, „language-game‟ and 
„family-resemblance concept‟) which he presented to the world. These concepts have 
resonated through philosophy, and are what Wittgenstein is most remembered for. 
     Again it‟s worth noting that this discussion leaves to one side a whole dimension of 
Wittgenstein‟s discussion of rule-following: the public character of rule-following 
rightness. This very striking aspect of Wittgenstein‟s account of meaning – according to 
which I am hostage to my community to some degree with respect to whether I follow a 
rule rightly or wrongly – has received a great deal of attention; so much so that the 
possibility that there might also be a „private‟ dimension to Wittgenstein‟s discussion of 
meaning has been neglected. This situation is possibly created in part by an ambiguity in 
the term „meaning‟, between the initial (private) projectibility of a sign and its long-term 
(public) use and development. Both are forms of generality, insofar as they are irreducible 
to particular existent facts, and thus both are vulnerable to Kripkean „rule-following‟ 
scepticism – but they are not the same. The view that Secondness is the only mode of 
being (which Peirce saw as a form of nominalism) has arguably been so monolithic 
within philosophy that those who have opposed it have found it hard to gain a clear sense 
of what they were arguing for. In this regard, Peirce‟s distinction between Firstness and 
                                      
47
  In a complex and interesting paper which examines unpublished manuscripts from Wittgenstein‟s 
middle period, Robert Alva Noë has also urged that Wittgenstein be considered as engaged in 
phenomenology. Noë concentrates on Wittgenstein‟s discussions of colour, rebutting a claim by 
Arthur Danto that in discussing colour Wittgenstein was “doing anticipatory science badly”. Robert 
Alva Noë, “Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What It Makes Sense to Say”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 54 (March, 1994), p. 3n. 
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Thirdness within a commitment to “real generality” may be one of his most profound 
philosophical legacies, and more work could be done on this fascinating topic. 
 
3.4. Peirce, Wittgenstein, and “Critical Common-sensism” 
Wittgenstein thought (and again this is very ironic considering the use he is put to by 
Kripke) that it was very important to limit the use of scepticism within philosophy. He 
believed that meaningful doubt occurs only in certain well-defined contexts – for 
instance, meaningful doubt is not necessarily possible just because we can imagine that 
the belief in question might be false.
48
 Hence Wittgenstein‟s famous remark:  
 
“How am I able to obey a rule?”–if this is not a question about causes, then it is 
about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. 
    If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is 
turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”49 
 
In fact this remark encapsulates Wittgenstein‟s approach to rule-following in a nutshell. 
Note the phenomenological character of Wittgenstein‟s statement that, when challenged 
over the proper application of a given rule, his claim that “This is simply what I do” is not 
„the right answer‟, but simply what he is inclined to say. Not only did Wittgenstein 
believe that there is only so much that one can meaningfully doubt, however, he believed 
that the attempt to doubt too much can be intellectually (and ethically) corrosive.  
     Peirce took a position on the relationship between philosophical scepticism and 
common-sense that was similar to Wittgenstein‟s in many ways. Later in life he liked to 
describe himself as a “Critical Common-sensist”. Critical Common-sensism holds that 
inquiry grows out of and is continuous with ordinary language and common-sense and 
because of this there will always be “indubitable propositions (5.440)” (and also 
indubitable inferences). Not only can we not doubt these propositions, Peirce thought, it 
is harmful to try. There is no set list of indubitables, however. As inquiry develops, 
certain propositions move from the indubitable to the dubitable (and vice versa). Peirce 
also believed, like Wittgenstein, that meaningful doubt only occurs against a background 
of belief, specifically targeting Descartes‟ recommendation to begin inquiry by 
systematically doubting all one‟s beliefs.50 
                                      
48
  Wittgenstein, Investigations, §84: 
But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. I can 
easily imagine someone always doubting before he opened his front door whether an abyss did 
not yawn behind it, and making sure before he went through the door (and he might on some 
occasion prove to be right)–but that does not make me doubt in the same case. 
49
  Wittgenstein, Investigations, §217. 
50
  See 2.192, 5.265, 5.498 and 5.524. 
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     Thus, the great irony of this discussion is that Wittgenstein, far from being the arch-
sceptic Kripke imagines, in fact displays a candid and trusting acceptance of an entire 
mode of being (Thirdness) which prevailing realisms doubt so unconsciously that the 
scepticism in question is difficult even to discuss. Were the consequences of this doubt in 
philosophical areas such as logic, epistemology and philosophy of mind drawn out as 
carefully and systematically as Kripke (stung by the strangeness of Wittgenstein‟s 
presentation of rule-following) has done, this „Thirdness-scepticism‟ would be seen to be 
quite intellectually debilitating. Unfortunately, such a careful sounding of these 
philosophical issues as Kripke‟s is all too rare. 
     Peirce and Wittgenstein are not in harmony on all issues, however. At times 
Wittgenstein feels the need to define himself against realism per se, rather than the 
reductionist metaphysical version of it which he rightly queries. This eschewal leads 
Wittgenstein to exhibit a harsh antinaturalism about the mind in passages such as the 
following: 
 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
“young science”; its stage is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings... 
   The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of 





This has led to the setting up (by Wittgenstein‟s disciples in particular) of “reasons” and 
“causes” as the theoretical equivalent of oil and water, which need to be quarantined from 
each other in entirely different discourses. On the other hand, Secondness and Thirdness 
(the Peircean categories which possess a telling isomorphism with Wittgenstein‟s 
“causes” and “reasons” respectively) are equally important, irreducible to one another, 
and compresent in everything conceivable insofar as it is conceivable. Though, as we 
have seen, for Peirce there is a further, equally important category – the Firstness that 
(among other things) qualitatively characterises each concept in a unique way. 
     Wittgenstein and Peirce also differ, as noted earlier, over the desirousness of 
theoretical heterogeneity. Wittgenstein, in countering totalising metaphysical 
explanations of phenomena such as rule-following, has been moved to give up the idea 
that large-scale explanations may be found in philosophy. Rather, he holds that, “if the 
words “language”, “experience”, “world”, have a use, it must be as humble a one as that 
                                      
51
  Wittgenstein, Investigations, p. 232. 
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of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”.”52 Realism in its deepest sense may, however, be 
understood as explanatory ambition (which ambition, this paper has suggested, need not 
be restricted to metaphysical explanations). If we understand realism this way, then 
insofar as the category of Thirdness can play the large-scale theoretical role which Peirce 
claims it does, Peirce‟s realistic explanatory optimism seems vindicated over 
Wittgenstein‟s nominalistic explanatory pessimism.53 (Though from the perspective of 
Peirce‟s fallibilism it is important to note that the question remains open.) 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
At the first presentation of the rule-following problem, it was remarked that the infinite 
„semantic reaching‟ which characterises our grasp of general predicates is liable to seem 
„superphysicalistic‟, which leads to a scepticism about how such a feat might be achieved. 
However this paper has shown that rules are not superphysicalistic. It is just that 
particular, existent (causally efficacious) fact is not the only mode of being. Secondness 
must be supplemented by Thirdness (and Firstness) to even begin to do justice to basic, 
undeniable facts about perception and the use of language. No proof is offered for this 
insight, but none is required. Rather, the fact is made plain by simple acknowledgement 
of the way in which we think and live. With respect to untangling the notoriously knotty 
rule-following problem, then, Peirce‟s decision to separate phenomenology from both 
logic and metaphysics – and to give a founding philosophical role to those things which I 
do “before I know what I am about” – seems vindicated. As Wittgenstein once remarked: 
“God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of everyone‟s eyes.”54  
 
 
                                      
52
  Wittgenstein, Investigations, §97. 
53
  Again, see Rorty, “Pragmatism, Categories, and Language”, especially p. 223. 
54
  Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. by G.H. von Wright, in collaboration with H. Nyman, trs. 
 Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 63e. 
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